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ABSTRACT
Under mild assumptions, the data indicate that ﬂuctuations in nominal interest rate diﬀerentials
across currencies are primarily ﬂuctuations in time-varying risk. This ﬁnding is an immediate
implication of the fact that exchange rates are roughly random walks. If most ﬂuctuations in
interest diﬀerentials are thought to be driven by monetary policy, then the data call for a theory
which explains how changes in monetary policy change risk. Here we propose such a theory based
on a general equilibrium monetary model with an endogenous source of risk variation–a variable
degree of asset market segmentation.
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used to the fact that most returns and price variation comes from variation in
risk premia. (Cochrane 2001, p. 451)
Cochrane’s observation directs our attention to a critical counterfactual part of the standard
general equilibrium monetary model: constant risk premia. Variation in risk over time is
essential for understanding movements in asset prices; that has been widely documented.
Yet the standard model does not generate time-varying risk premia. We develop a simple,
general equilibrium monetary model that does. In our model, the asset market is segmented;
at any time, only a fraction of the model’s agents choose to participate in that market. Risk
premia in our model thus vary over time because the degree of asset market segmentation
varies over time, endogenously, in response to stochastic shocks.
We apply the model to interest rates and exchange rates because data on those vari-
ables provide some of the most compelling evidence that variation in risk premia is a prime
mover behind variation in asset prices. In fact, a stylized view of the data on interest rates and
e x c h a n g er a t e si st h a to b s e r v e dv a r i a t i o n si ni n t e r e s tr a t ed i ﬀerentials across bonds denomi-
n a t e di nd i ﬀerent currencies are accounted for almost entirely by variations in risk premia.
To make this view concrete, consider the risk, in nominal terms, faced by a U.S.
investor choosing between bonds denominated in either dollars or euros. Clearly, for this
investor, the dollar return on the euro bond is risky because next period’s exchange rate is
not known today. The risk premium compensates the investor who chooses to hold the euro
bond for taking on this exchange rate risk. Speciﬁc a l l y ,i nl o g s ,t h erisk premium pt is equal
to the expected log dollar return on a euro bond minus the log dollar return on a dollar bond,
pt = i
∗
t + Et loget+1 − loget − it,
where i∗
t and it are the logs of euro and dollar gross interest rates and et is the exchange
rate between the currencies.1 The diﬀerence in nominal interest rates across currencies can
thus be divided into the expected change in the exchange rate between these currencies and
a currency risk premium.
In standard equilibrium models of interest rates and exchange rates, since risk premia
are constant, interest rate diﬀerentials move one-for-one with the expected change in theexchange rate. However, nearly the opposite seems to happen in the data: the expected
change in the exchange rate is roughly constant and interest diﬀerentials move approximately
one-for-one with risk premia. More precisely, one view of the data is that exchange rates are
roughly random walks, so that the expected depreciation of a currency, Et loget+1 − loget,
is roughly constant. (See, for example, the discussion in section 9.3.2 of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
1996.) Under this view, the interest rate diﬀerential, i∗
t − it, is approximately equal to the
risk premium pt plus a constant. The observed variation in the interest rate diﬀerential is,
thus, almost entirely accounted for by movement in the risk premium.
A more nuanced view of the data is that exchange rates are not exactly random walks;
instead, when a currency’s interest rate is high, that currency is expected to appreciate.
This observation, documented by Fama (1984), Hodrick (1987), and Backus, Foresi, and
Telmer (1995), among others, is widely referred to as the forward premium anomaly. The
observation seems to contradict intuition, which predicts instead that investors will demand
higher interest rates on currencies that are expected to fall, not rise, in value. To explain the
data, then, theory requires large ﬂuctuations in risk premia, larger even than those in the
interest rate diﬀerentials.
Our contribution here is to build a model to exposit a potential mechanism through
which changes in monetary policy change risk in a way consistent with the forward premium
anomaly. Why should one be interested in such a mechanism? Under mild assumptions, the
forward premium anomaly is a demonstration that in the data the changes in interest rate
diﬀerentials are changes in the risk of investments in diﬀerent currencies. If most changes in
interest rate diﬀerentials are thought to be driven by monetary policy changes, then the data
call for a theory of how such policy changes change risk. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst
to propose such a mechanism. Since the mechanism is new, we keep the analysis simple and
transparent. For example, we purposefully abstract from trade in goods in the body. (See
Appendix A for an extension of the model that has trade in goods.)
Our model is a two-country, pure exchange, cash-in-advance economy. The key diﬀer-
ence between this model and the standard cash-in-advance model is that here agents must pay
a ﬁxed cost to transfer money between the goods market and the asset market. We imagine
agents as having a brokerage account in the asset market in which they hold a portfolio of
2interest-bearing assets and having to pay a ﬁx e dc o s tt om o v ec a s hi n t oo ro u to ft h i sa c c o u n t .
The cost is similar in spirit to that in the models of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), in that
it leads to segmentation of the market in which cash and other money-like assets are traded
for bonds and other interest-bearing assets. In our model, the ﬁxed transfer cost diﬀers across
agents. In each period, agents with a ﬁxed transfer cost below some cutoﬀ level pay it and
thus, at the margin, freely exchange money and bonds. Agents with a ﬁxed transfer cost
higher than the cutoﬀ level choose not to pay it, so do not make these exchanges. This is the
sense in which our model’s asset market is segmented.
The model’s mechanism through which asset market segmentation leads to variable
risk premia is straightforward. Monetary policy changes change the inﬂation rate, which
changes the net beneﬁt of participating in the asset market. An increase in money growth,
for example, increases the fraction of agents that participate in the asset market, reduces
the eﬀect of a given money injection on the marginal utility of any participating agent, and
thus lowers the risk premium. We show, by way of example, that this type of variable risk
premium can be the primary force driving interest rate diﬀe r e n t i a l sa c r o s sc u r r e n c i e sa n d
that it can generate the forward premium anomaly.
Essentially, our analysis of the model has two parts. First we develop a monetary
model with segmented asset markets that delivers a pricing kernel which we approximate as
a log-quadratic function of money growth. The quadratic part of the kernel is the feature
through which homoscedastic money growth delivers time-varying risk. In the second part of
the analysis, we show that our log-quadratic pricing kernel can generate the forward premium
anomaly if the persistence of money growth is in an intermediate range.
In the second part we also present a numerical example which illustrates our model’s
implications for the behavior of interest rates and exchange rates over time. Our model
also has implications for the patterns of long-run averages of interest rate diﬀerentials and
exchange rate depreciations in a cross section of currencies.
The idea that segmented asset markets can generate large risk premia in certain asset
prices is not new. (See, for example, Allen and Gale 1994, Basak and Cuoco 1998, and
Alvarez and Jermann 2001.) Existing models, however, focus on generating constant risk
premia, which for some applications is relevant. As we have argued, any attempt to account
3for the data on interest rate diﬀe r e n t i a l sa n de x c h a n g er a t e sr e q u i r e sr i s kp r e m i at h a ta r e
not only large but also highly variable. Unlike other models, ours generates such large and
variable premia.
Our model is related to a huge literature on generating large and variable risk premia
in general equilibrium models. The work of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991) has established that in order to generate large risk premia, the gen-
eral equilibrium model must produce extremely variable pricing kernels. Also well-known is
the fact that because of the data’s rather small variations in aggregate consumption, a rep-
resentative agent model with standard utility functions cannot generate large and variable
risk premia. Therefore, attempts to account for foreign exchange risk premia in models of
this type fail dramatically. (See Backus, Gregory, and Telmer 1993, Canova and Marrinan
1993, Bansal et al. 1995, Bekaert 1996, Engel 1996, and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 2001.) Indeed,
the only way such models could generate large and variable risk premia is by generating an
implied series for aggregate consumption that both is many times more variable and has a
variance that ﬂuctuates much more than that of observed consumption.
Faced with these diﬃculties, researchers have split the study of risk in general equi-
librium models into two branches. One branch investigates new classes of utility functions
that make the marginal utility of consumption extremely sensitive to small variations in con-
sumption. The work of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) typiﬁes this branch. Bekaert (1996),
Bansal and Shaliastovich (2007), and Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) examine the ability of
models along these lines to generate large and variable foreign exchange risk premia. The
other research branch investigates limited participation models, in which the consumption
of the marginal investor is not equal to aggregate consumption. The work of Alvarez and
Jermann (2001) and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) typiﬁes this branch.
Our work here is ﬁrmly part of that second branch. In our model, the consumption
of the marginal investor is quite variable even though aggregate consumption is essentially
constant. For evidence in support of the view that marginal investors have quite variable
consumption, see Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
To keep our analysis here simple, we take an extreme view of the limited participation
4idea. In our model, aggregate consumption is (essentially) constant, so it plays no role in
pricing risk. Instead, this risk is priced by the marginal investor, whose consumption is quite
diﬀerent from aggregate consumption. In this sense, our model provides a potential resolution
to the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle that ﬂuctuations in real exchange rates are not highly
correlated with ﬂuctuations in aggregate consumption.
Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (1995) and Engel (1996) have emphasized that standard
monetary models with standard utility functions have no chance of producing the forward pre-
mium anomaly because these models generate a constant risk premium whenever the under-
lying driving processes have constant conditional variances. Backus, Foresi, and Telmer argue
that empirically this anomaly is not likely to be generated by primitive processes that have
nonconstant conditional variances. (See also Hodrick 1989.) Instead, these researchers argue,
what is needed is a model that generates nonconstant risk premia from driving processes that
have constant conditional variances. Our model does that.
Our work builds on that of Rotemberg (1985) and Alvarez and Atkeson (1997) and is
most closely related to that of our earlier (2002) work. Our work here is also related to that
of Grilli and Roubini (1992) and Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1995), who study the eﬀects of
money injections on exchange rates in two-country variants of the models of Lucas (1990) and
Fuerst (1992). All of these earlier studies focus on how money shocks can lead to variable real
exchange rates in models with segmented asset markets. None of them, however, examine
the time variation in currency risk premia, which is our central focus. In our 2002 work, in
particular, the pricing kernel we developed implies that risk premia are constant over time.
Hence, that pricing kernel is clearly irrelevant for addressing the issues we focus on here.
1. Some Observations on Risk, Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates
Here we document that ﬂuctuations in interest rate diﬀerentials across bonds denominated in
diﬀerent currencies are large, and we develop more fully our argument that these ﬂuctuations
are driven mainly by time-varying risk.
A. The Data
The characteristics of interest rate diﬀerentials across bonds denominated in diﬀerent curren-
cies have been documented in detail by Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001). They compute
5statistics on the diﬀerence between monthly euro currency interest rates denominated in U.S.
dollars and the corresponding interest rates for the other G-7 currencies over the time period
July 1974 through November 1994. We display some of these statistics in Table 1. The
average of the standard deviations of these interest rate diﬀerentials is large: over three per-
centage points on an annualized basis. (To annualize the monthly standard deviations in
Table 1, multiply them by 12.) Moreover, the interest rate diﬀerentials are quite persistent:
at a monthly level, the average of their ﬁrst-order autocorrelations is .83.
B. The Argument and the Anomaly
To see that these large, persistent ﬂuctuations in interest rate diﬀerentials are driven mainly
by time-varying risk, return to the example in the introduction, where a U.S. investor faced
a choice between bonds denominated in either dollars or euros. Again, deﬁne the (log) risk
premium for a euro-denominated bond as the expected log dollar return on a euro bond minus
the log dollar return on a dollar bond. Let exp(it) and exp(i∗
t) be the nominal interest rates
on the dollar and euro bonds and et be the price of euros (foreign currency) in units of dollars
(home currency), or the exchange rate between the currencies, in a time period t. The dollar
return on a euro bond, exp(i∗
t)et+1/et, is obtained by converting a dollar in period t to 1/et
euros, buying a euro bond paying interest exp(i∗
t), and then converting the resulting euros
back to dollars in t +1a tt h ee x c h a n g er a t eet+1.T h e r i s k p r e m i u m pt is then deﬁned as




t + Et loget+1 − loget − it. (1)
Clearly, the dollar return on the euro bond is risky because the future exchange rate et+1 is
not known in t. The risk premium compensates the holder of the euro bond for accepting this
exchange rate risk.
To see our argument in its simplest form, suppose that the exchange rate follows a
random walk, so that the expected depreciation of a currency, Et loget+1−loget, is constant.
Since (1) implies that
it − i
∗
t = −pt + Et loget+1 − loget, (2)
6the interest rate diﬀerential is just the risk premium plus a constant. Hence, all of the
movements in the interest rate diﬀerential are matched by corresponding movements in the




In the data, however, exchange rates are only approximately random walks. In fact,
one of the most puzzling features of the exchange rate data is the tendency for high interest
rate currencies to appreciate, in that
cov(it − i
∗
t,loget+1 − loget) ≤ 0, (3)
which is equivalent to
cov(it − i
∗
t,E t loget+1 − loget) ≤ 0. (4)
The inequality (3) implies that exchange rates are not random walks, because expected de-
preciation rates are correlated with interest rate diﬀerentials.
This tendency for high interest rate currencies to appreciate has been widely docu-
mented for the currencies of the major industrialized countries over the period of ﬂoating
exchange rates. (For a recent discussion, see, for example, Backus, Foresi, and Telmer 2001.)
The inequality (3) is commonly referred to as the forward premium anomaly.2 In the litera-
ture, this anomaly is documented by a regression of the change in the exchange rates on the
interest rate diﬀerential of the form
loget+1 − loget = a + b(it − i
∗
t)+ut+1. (5)
Such regressions typically yield estimates of b that are zero or negative. We refer to b as the
slope coeﬃcient in the Fama regression.
The estimated size of b is particularly puzzling because b ≤ 0 implies that ﬂuctuations
in risk premia that are needed to account for ﬂuctuations in interest diﬀerentials are even
larger than those needed if exchange rates followed random walks:3
var (pt) ≥ var (it − i
∗
t). (6)
7It is easy to see that b ≤ 0 implies that
cov(Et loget+1 − loget,p t) > 0
and that
var (pt) ≥ var (Et loget+1 − loget). (7)
In other words, the ﬁnding that the slope coeﬃcient in the Fama regression is negative
implies that exchange rates are expected to appreciate when the risk premium falls and that
the movement in the risk premium is larger than the expected appreciation of the exchange
rate.
2. A Model with Time-Varying Risk
We now describe a model–ﬁr s tg e n e r a l l ya n dt h e ni nd e t a i l – t h a tc a ng e n e r a t et h eo b s e r -
vations just discussed. It is a general equilibrium monetary model with segmented markets
that generates time-varying risk premia. After developing this model, we characterize its
equilibrium values of consumption and real balances and show how money growth in the
model is linked to the marginal utility of its asset market participants.
A. An Outline
We start by sketching out the basic structure of our model.
Consider a two-country, cash-in-advance economy with an inﬁnite number of periods
t =0 ,1,2,....Call one country the home country and the other the foreign country. Each
country has a government and a continuum of households of measure one. Households in the
home country use the home currency, dollars, to purchase a home good. Households in the
foreign country use the foreign currency, euros, to purchase a foreign good.
Trade in this economy in periods t ≥ 1 occurs in three separate locations: an asset
market available to both countries and one goods market in each country. In the asset market,
households trade the two currencies and dollar and euro bonds, which promise delivery of the
relevant currency in the asset market in the next period, and the two countries’ governments
introduce their currencies via open market operations. In each goods market, households use
the local currency to buy the local good subject to a cash-in-advance constraint and sell their
8endowment of the local good for local currency. In period 0 there is an initial round of trade
in bonds in the asset market with no trade in goods markets.
Each household must pay a real ﬁxed cost γ f o re a c ht r a n s f e ro fc a s hb e t w e e nt h ea s s e t
market and a goods market. This ﬁxed cost is constant over time for any speciﬁch o u s e h o l d ,
but it varies across households in both countries according to a distribution F(γ) with density
f(γ).4 Households are indexed by their ﬁxed cost γ.T h eﬁxed costs for households in each
country are in units of the local good. We assume F(0) > 0, so that a positive mass of
households has a zero ﬁxed cost.
The only source of uncertainty in this economy is shocks to money growth in the two
countries. The timing within each period t ≥ 1 for a household in the home country is
illustrated in Figure 1. We emphasize the physical separation of the markets by separating
them in the ﬁgure. Households in the home country enter the period with the cash P−1y
they obtained from selling their home good endowments in t−1, where P−1 is the price level
and y is their endowment of their home good. Each government conducts an open market
operation in the asset market, which determines the realizations of money growth rates μ and
μ∗ in the two countries and the current price levels in the two countries P and P ∗.
The household then splits into a worker and a shopper. Each period the worker sells
the household endowment y for cash Py and rejoins the shopper at the end of the period.
The shopper takes the household’s cash P−1y with real value n = P−1y/P and shops for
goods. The shopper can choose to pay the ﬁxed cost γ to transfer an amount of cash Px
with real value x to or from the asset market. This ﬁx e dc o s ti sp a i di nc a s ho b t a i n e di nt h e
asset market. If the shopper pays the ﬁxed cost, then the cash-in-advance constraint is that
consumption c = n + x; otherwise, this constraint is c = n.
The household also enters the period with bonds that are claims to cash in the asset
market with payoﬀs contingent on the rates of money growth μ and μ∗ in the current period.
This cash can be either reinvested in the asset market or, if the ﬁxed cost is paid, transferred
to the goods market. With B denoting the current payoﬀ of the state-contingent bonds
purchased in the past, q the price of bonds, and
R
qB0 the household’s purchases of new
bonds, the asset market constraint is B =
R
qB0 + P(x + γ) if the ﬁx e dc o s ti sp a i da n d
B =
R
qB0 otherwise. At the beginning of period t +1, the household starts with cash Py in
9the goods market and a portfolio of contingent bonds B0 in the asset market.
In equilibrium, households with a suﬃciently low ﬁxed cost pay it and transfer cash
between the goods and asset markets while others do not. We refer to households that pay
the ﬁxed cost as active and those that do not as inactive. Inactive households simply consume
their current real balances.
Throughout, we assume that the shoppers are not allowed to store cash from one
period to the next. This assumption implies that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with
equality and greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. For some models in which agents are allowed to
store cash and end up doing so in equilibrium, see the work of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond
(2003) and Khan and Thomas (2007).
We also assume throughout that in the asset market, households hold their assets in
interest-bearing bonds rather than cash. Notet h a ta sl o n ga sn o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t e sa r e
positive, bonds dominate cash held in the asset market.
B. The Details
Now we ﬂesh out this outline of the economy.
Let Mt denote the stock of dollars in period t, and let μt = Mt/Mt−1 denote the
growth rate of this stock. Similarly, let μ∗
t b et h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h es t o c ko fe u r o sM∗
t . Let
st =( μt,μ ∗
t) denote the aggregate event in period t.T h e n l e t st =( s1,...,s t) denote the
state, consisting of the history of aggregate events through period t, and let g(st) denote the
density of the probability distribution over such histories.
In period 0 there is an initial round of trade in bonds in the asset market with no
trade in goods markets. In the asset market in period 0, home households of type γ have
M0 units of home money (dollars), ¯ Bh(γ) units of the home government debt (bonds), and
¯ B∗
h units of the foreign government debt, which are claims on ¯ Bh(γ) dollars and ¯ B∗
h euros in
the asset market in that period. Likewise, in the asset market in period 0 foreign households
start with M∗
0 euro holdings in the foreign goods market, ¯ Bf units of the home government
debt, and ¯ B∗
f(γ) units of the foreign government debt in the asset market.
The home government issues one-period dollar bonds contingent on the aggregate
state st.I np e r i o dt,g i v e ns t a t est, t h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tp a y so ﬀ outstanding bonds B(st)
10in dollars and issues claims to dollars in the next asset market of the form B(st,s t+1) at prices
q(st,s t+1).L e t¯ B denote the stock of outstanding dollar bonds at the beginning of period 0.









t,s t+1) dst+1 (8)
with M(s0)= ¯ M given, and in t =0 ,t h ec o n s t r a i n ti s ¯ B =
R
s1 q(s1)B(s1) ds1. Likewise, the
foreign government issues euro bonds denoted B∗(st) with bond prices denoted q∗(st,s t+1).
The budget constraints for the foreign government are then analogous to the home govern-
ment’s constraints above.
In the asset market in each period and state, home households trade a complete set
of one-period dollar bonds and euro bonds that have payoﬀs next period contingent on the







where e(st) is the exchange rate for one euro in terms of dollars in state st. This arbitrage
relationship implies that the home and foreign bonds are each separately a complete set of
state-contingent assets. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that home households
hold only home bonds and foreign households hold only foreign bonds.
Consider now the problem of households of type γ i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y .L e tP(st) denote
the price level in dollars in the home goods market in period t. In each period t ≥ 1, in the
goods market, these households start the period with dollar real balances n(st,γ). They then
choose transfers of real balances between the goods market and the asset market x(st,γ),
an indicator variable z(st,γ) equal to zero if these transfers are zero and one if they are
more than zero, and consumption of the home good c(st,γ) subject to the cash-in-advance











11where in (10) in t =1 , the term n(s1,γ) is given by M0/p(s1). In the asset market in t ≥ 1,
home households begin with cash payments B(st,γ) on their bonds. They purchase new bonds















Assume that both consumption c(st,γ) a n dr e a lb o n dh o l d i n g sB(st,γ)/P(st) are uniformly
bounded by some large constants.
In period 0, the asset market constraint for home households is given by






In this initial period, home and foreign households trade bonds denominated in the two
currencies and insure themselves against the initial money growth shock s1.










subject to the constraints (10)—(12). Households in the foreign country solve the analogous
problem, with P∗(st) denoting the price level in euros in the foreign country goods market.
We require that
R ¯ Bh(γ)f(γ) dγ + ¯ Bf = ¯ B and ¯ B∗
h +
R ¯ B∗
f(γ)f(γ) dγ = ¯ B∗.
Since each transfer of cash between the asset market and the home goods market
consumes γ units of the home good, the total goods cost of carrying out all transfers between
home households and the asset market in t is γ
R
z(st,γ)f(γ) dγ, and likewise for the foreign






f(γ) dγ = y (14)
for all t, st, with the analogous constraint in the foreign country. The ﬁxed costs are paid
for with cash obtained in the asset market. Thus, the home country money market—clearing











f(γ) dγ = M(s
t)/P(s
t) (15)
for all st. The money market—clearing condition for the foreign country is analogous. We let
c denote the sequences of functions c(st,γ) and use similar notation for the other variables.
12An equilibrium in this economy is a collection of bond and goods prices (q, q∗) and (P,
P∗), together with bond holdings (B,B∗) and allocations for home and foreign households
(c,x,z,n) and (c∗,x ∗,z∗,n ∗), such that for each transfer cost γ, the bond holdings and the
allocations solve the households’ utility maximization problems, the governments’ budget
constraints hold, and the resource constraints and the money market—clearing conditions are
satisﬁed.
C. Characterizing Equilibrium
Now, in our model economy, we solve for the equilibrium consumption and real balances of
both active households (those that pay the ﬁxed cost and transfer cash between asset and
goods markets) and inactive households (those that do not). We then characterize the link
between the consumption of active households and asset prices. We focus on households in
the home country; the analysis of households in the foreign country is similar.
Consumption and Real Balances
We start with a household’s decision whether or not to pay the ﬁx e dc o s ti no r d e rt ot r a n s f e r
cash between the asset and goods markets. Since households are not allowed to store cash in
the goods market, the cash-in-advance constraint always binds, and any household’s decision
to pay the ﬁxed cost in period t is static. This is because this decision aﬀects only the
household’s current consumption and bond holdings and not the real balances it holds later
in the goods market.




The inﬂation rate is πt = μt, and real money holdings are n(st,γ)=y/μt. Hence, the
consumption of inactive households is c(st,γ)=y/μt. Let cA(st,γ) denote the consumption
of an active household for a given st and γ.
In this economy, inﬂation is distorting because it reduces the consumption of any
household that chooses to be inactive. This eﬀect induces some households to use real re-
sources to pay the ﬁxed cost, thereby reducing the total amount of resources available for
consumption. This is the only distortion from inﬂation in the model. Because of this feature
13and our assumption that a complete set of nominal claims are traded in the asset market,
the competitive equilibrium allocations and asset prices can be found from the solution to
the following planning problem for the home country, together with that to the analogous
























The constraint (17) captures the restriction that the consumption of households that do not
pay the ﬁx e dc o s ti sp i n n e dd o w nb yt h e i rr e a lm o n e yb a l a n c e sy/μt. Here the planning weight
for households of type γ is simply the fraction of households of this type.
This planning problem can be decentralized with the appropriate settings of the initial
endowments of home and foreign government debt ¯ B(γ) and ¯ B∗(γ). Asset prices are obtained
from the multipliers on the resource constraints above. For simplicity, we have chosen to
focus on the economy in which initial bond holdings are allocated so that all households have
equal Lagrange multipliers on their period 0 budget constraints. The equilibrium allocations
of this economy correspond to those found as the solution to the planning problem with equal
Pareto weights given above. (Economies with diﬀerent distributions of bond holdings have
equilibrium allocations that correspond to planning problems that have Pareto weights that
depend on γ.)
Notice that the planning problem reduces to a sequence of static problems. We analyze
the consumption pattern ﬁrst for a ﬁxed choice z to pay the ﬁxed cost and then for the optimal
choice of z.











where λ(st) is the multiplier on the resource constraint. This ﬁrst-order condition clearly
implies that all households that pay the ﬁxed cost choose the same consumption level, which
means that cA(st,γ) is independent of γ. Since this problem is static, this consumption level
14depends on only the current money growth shock μt. Hence, we denote this consumption as
cA(μt).
Now, since the solution to the planning problem depends on only current μt and γ,
we drop its dependence on t. It should be clear that the optimal choice of z has a cutoﬀ rule
form: for each shock μ,t h e r ei ss o m eﬁxed cost level ¯ γ(μ) at which the households with γ ≤
¯ γ(μ) pay this ﬁxed cost and consume cA(μ), and all other households (the inactive ones) do
not pay and consume instead y/μ.F o re a c hμ, the planning problem thus reduces to choosing
two numbers, cA(μ) and ¯ γ(μ),t os o l v e
maxU(cA(μ))F(¯ γ(μ)) + U(y/μ)
h






γf(γ) dγ +( y/μ)
h
1 − F(¯ γ(μ))
i
= y. (19)
The ﬁrst-order conditions then can be summarized by (19) and
U(cA(μ)) − U(y/μ) − U
0(cA(μ))[cA(μ)+¯ γ(μ) − (y/μ)] = 0. (20)
In Appendix B, we show that the solution to these two equations, (19) and (20)–namely,
cA(μ) and ¯ γ(μ)–is unique. We then can describe the equilibrium consumption and real
balances of active and inactive households in the following proposition:






cA (μt) if γ ≤ ¯ γ(μt)
y/μt otherwise,
where the functions cA (μ) and ¯ γ(μ) are the solutions to (19) and (20).
Active Household Consumption and Asset Prices
Now we characterize the link between the consumption of active households and asset prices.
In the decentralized economy corresponding to the planning problem, asset prices are
given by the multipliers on the resource constraints for the planning problem. Here, from
(18), these multipliers are equal to the marginal utility of active households.






















These kernels are the state-contingent prices for dollars and euros normalized by the proba-
bilities of the state.
These pricing kernels can price any dollar or euro asset. In particular, the pricing
kernels immediately imply that any asset purchased in period t with a dollar return of Rt+1
between periods t and t +1satisﬁes the Euler equation
1=Etmt+1Rt+1, (23)
where, for simplicity here and in much of what follows, we drop the st notation. Likewise,
every possible euro asset with rate of return R∗






Note that exp(it) is the dollar return on a dollar-denominated bond with interest rate it,a n d
exp(i∗
t) is the expected euro return on a euro-denominated bond with interest rate i∗
t;t h e s e
Euler equations thus imply that





The pricing kernels for dollars and euros have a natural relation: m∗
t+1 = mt+1et+1/et.
This can be seen as follows. Every euro asset with euro rate of return R∗
t+1 has a corresponding
dollar asset with rate of return Rt+1 = R∗
t+1et+1/et formed when an investor converts dollars













Since (26) holds for every euro return, mt+1et+1/et is an equilibrium pricing kernel for euro
assets. Complete asset markets have only one euro pricing kernel, so
loget+1 − loget =l o gm
∗
t+1 − logmt+1. (27)
16Substituting (25) and (27) into our original expression for the risk premium (1) gives that
pt =( Et logm
∗
t+1 − Et logmt+1) − (logEtm
∗
t+1 − logEtmt+1). (28)
Hence, a currency’s risk premium depends on the diﬀerence between the expected value of
the log and the log of the expectation of the pricing kernel. Jensen’s inequality implies that
ﬂuctuations in the risk premium are driven by ﬂuctuations in the conditional variability of
the pricing kernel.
Finally, note that given the initial exchange rate e0 and (27) together with the kernels
gives the entire path of the nominal exchange rate et. It is easy to show that the initial
nominal exchange rate is given by
e0 =
³





where ¯ Bh =
R ¯ Bh(γ) dF(γ). Clearly, this exchange rate exists and is positive as long as either
¯ Bh < ¯ B and ¯ B∗
h > 0 or ¯ Bh > ¯ B and ¯ B∗
h < 0.
D. Linking Money Growth and Active Households’ Marginal Utility
In our model, the active households price assets in the sense that the pricing kernels (21) and
(22) are determined by those households’ marginal utilities. Thus, in order to characterize the
link between money growth and either interest rates or exchange rates, we need to determine
how these marginal utilities respond to changes in money growth, namely, how U0(cA(μt))
varies with μt.
The Theory
In the simplest monetary models (such as in Lucas 1982), all the agents are active every
period, and changes in money growth have no impact on marginal utilities. Our model
introduces two key innovations to those simple models. One is that here, because of the seg-
mentation of asset markets, changes in money growth do have an impact on the consumption
and, hence, the marginal utility of active households. Our model’s other innovation is that
t h es i z eo ft h i si m p a c tc h a n g e ss y s t e m a t i c a l l yw i t ht h es i z eo fm o n e yg r o w t h .A sw es h o w ,
the change in the size of this impact can be large because the degree of market segmentation
is endogenous. With these two innovations, our model can deliver large and variable currency
risk premia even though the fundamental shocks have constant variance.
17Mechanically, our model generates variable risk premia that fall as money growth
rises when logcA(μ) is increasing and concave in logμ. To see the link between risk premia
and logcA(μ), deﬁne φ(μ) to be the elasticity of the marginal utility of active households
to a change in money growth. With constant relative risk aversion preferences of the form








Note from (30) that when logcA(μ) is increasing in logμ, φ(μ) > 0. The larger is
φ(μ), the more sensitive is the marginal utility of active households to money growth. Also
note that when logcA(μ) is concave in logμ, φ(μ) decreases in μ; this means the marginal
utility of active households is more sensitive to money growth changes at low levels of money
growth than at high. In this sense, the concavity of logcA(μ) implies that the variability of
the pricing kernel decreases as money growth increases.
We now characterize features of our model’s equilibrium in two propositions. The
proofs of both are in Appendix B.
Proposition 2. As μ increases, more households become active. In particular, ¯ γ0 (μ) > 0 for
μ>1, and ¯ γ0 (1) = 0.
Proposition 3. The log of the consumption of active households cA(μ) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in logμ around μ =1 . In particular, φ(1) > 0 and φ
0(1) < 0.
In Proposition 2, we have shown that more households choose to become active as
money growth and inﬂation increase. This result is intuitive because as inﬂation increases,
so does the cost of not participating in the asset market, since the consumption of inactive
households, y/μ, falls as money growth μ increases.
In Proposition 3, we have shown that locally, for low values of money growth at least,
the consumption of active households is increasing and concave in money growth.
A Quadratic Approximation
To capture the nonlinearity of cA(μ) in a tractable way for computing the asset prices im-
plied by our model, we take a second-order approximation to the marginal utility of active
18households of the form
logU
0(cA(μt)) =l o gU


























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
μ=¯ μ
.
With this quadratic approximation, we have that the pricing kernel is given by











Throughout, we assume that the log of home money growth has normal innovations,
or shocks, so that
ˆ μt+1 = Etˆ μt+1 + εt+1 (34)
and likewise for foreign money growth. Here εt+1 and ε∗
t+1 are the independent shocks across
countries and are both normal with mean zero and variance σ2
ε.
Note for later that in the standard model, since cA(μ) is constant, φ = η =0 .
3. The Model’s Implications
We have developed our general equilibrium monetary model and derived from it a pricing
kernel (33). For the rest of the analysis, we use this pricing kernel, together with the driving
process for the shocks (34), to work out our model’s equilibrium implications for interest rates
and exchange rates. We also work through a numerical example which allows us to see that
our model’s implications are, at least qualitatively, consistent with some patterns of behavior
apparent in the data.
A. The Relationship Between Money Growth and Risk Premia
We begin by using our pricing kernel (33) to show how the risk premium varies systematically
with changes in money growth. We show that the risk premium varies even if shocks to money
growth have constant conditional variances. In particular, we show that locally a persistent
increase in money growth decreases the risk premium pt.
19Recall that the risk premium can be written in terms of the pricing kernel as in (28):
pt =( l o gEtmt+1 − Et logmt+1) − (logEtm
∗
t+1 − Et logm
∗
t+1). (35)
Note that if the pricing kernel mt+1 were a conditionally lognormal variable, then, as is well-
known, logEtmt+1 = Et logmt+1 +( 1 /2)vart(logmt+1). In such a case, the risk premium
pt would equal half the diﬀerence of the conditional variances of the log kernels. Given our
quadratic approximation (33), however, the pricing kernel is not conditionally lognormal;
still, a similar relationship between the risk premium and the conditional variance of the
kernel holds.
This relationship is established in the next proposition, the proof of which is in Appen-




ε < 1, (36)
which we assume for the remainder of our analysis.6
























and a symmetric formula holds for vart(logm∗
t+1).
To see how the risk premium varies with money growth, we calculate the derivative of











Together (36) and (39) imply that the risk premium falls as home money growth rises if
logcA(μ) is concave in logμ,s ot h a tη>0, and if money growth is persistent, so that
dEtˆ μt+1/dˆ μt is positive. Thus, under very simple conditions, we have that the risk premium
decreases as the money growth rate increases.
20The idea behind that relationship is as follows. Since η is positive, the sensitivity
of marginal utility to ﬂuctuations in money growth decreases as expected money growth
increases. Since money growth is persistent, a high money growth rate in period t leads
households to forecast a higher money growth rate in period t +1 . Thus, a high money
growth rate in period t leads households to predict less variable marginal utility in period
t +1 . Hence, the risk premium in period t decreases as the money growth rate increases in
period t.
B. The Forward Premium Anomaly
We now show that this relationship between money growth and risk premia can lead our model
to generate the forward premium anomaly–the tendency for high interest rate currencies to
appreciate over time. A necessary circumstance is that the persistence of money growth be
within an intermediate range.




t = Et loget+1 − loget − pt. (40)
As we have seen, a persistent increase in money growth leads the risk premium pt to fall.
When this increase in money growth also leads to an expected exchange rate appreciation
smaller than the fall in the risk premium, the interest rate diﬀerential increases, and our
model generates the forward premium anomaly.
The simplest case to study is when exchange rates are random walks, for then an
increase in money growth has no eﬀect on the expected change in the value of the currency.
In this case, because the covariance between the interest rate diﬀerential and the expected
change in the exchange rate is zero, the model generates, at least weakly, the forward premium
anomaly.
The more general case is when a persistent increase in money growth leads to an
expected exchange rate appreciation. Recall that in standard models without market seg-
mentation, a persistent increase in money growth leads to the opposite: an expected depreci-
ation. Here we discuss in some detail how our model with asset market segmentation delivers
diﬀerent implications for the eﬀects of money growth on the exchange rate.
21To see how an increase in money growth can lead to an expected appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate et in our model, it is helpful to write this expected appreciation as
the sum of the expected appreciation of the real exchange rate and the expected inﬂation
diﬀerential:





where the real exchange rate vt = etP ∗
t /Pt. I nas t a n d a r dm o d e l ,a ni n c r e a s ei nm o n e yg r o w t h
leads to an expected nominal depreciation because the increased money growth increases
expected inﬂation but has no eﬀect on real exchange rates. In our model, an increase in
money growth leads to an expected real depreciation that dominates the expected inﬂation
eﬀect.7
Using our pricing kernels (21) and (22), our expression for changes in exchange rates
(27), and the expression for the home price level together with (16) and its foreign analog,









0(cAt)] + Et[logμt+1 − logμ
∗
t+1], (42)
where the ﬁrst bracketed term corresponds to the change in the real exchange rate and the
second to the expected inﬂation diﬀerential. Hence, we can decompose the eﬀect of money
growth changes on the expected change in the nominal exchange rate into two parts: a market
segmentation eﬀect and an expected inﬂation eﬀect. The market segmentation eﬀect measures
the impact of an increase in money growth on the expected change in the real exchange rate
through its impact on the marginal utilities in the ﬁrst bracketed term in (42). This eﬀect
is not present in the standard general equilibrium model, which has no segmentation. The
expected inﬂation eﬀect, which is present in the standard model, measures the impact of an
increase in money growth on the expected inﬂation diﬀerential in the second bracketed term
in (42).
Now consider the impact of a persistent increase in money growth on the expected
change in the nominal exchange rate. The expected inﬂation eﬀect is simply
d(Et logμt+1)/dlogμt. (43)
22This eﬀect is larger the more persistent is money growth. In the standard model, this is the
only eﬀect because in that model cA(μ) is constant (and, hence, φ = η =0 ) . In the standard
model, then, an increase in money growth of one percentage point leads to an expected
nominal depreciation of size d(Et logμt+1)/dlogμt.
T h es i z eo ft h em a r k e ts e g m e n t a t i o ne ﬀect depends on both the degree of market
segmentation and the persistence of money growth. This follows because a persistent increase
in the home money growth rate μt aﬀects both the current real exchange rate







and, by increasing the expected money growth rate in t+1 , the expected real exchange rate







Using (42), we see that an increase in the home money growth rate ˆ μt leads to an expected
change in the real exchange rate of
d
dˆ μt







w h e r ew eh a v ee v a l u a t e dt h i sd e r i v a t i v ea tμt =¯ μ and used our quadratic approximation to
the marginal utility of active households.8
As long as money growth is mean-reverting, in that d(Etˆ μt+1)/dˆ μt < 1, an increase
in money growth near the steady state leads to an expected real appreciation. Clearly, the
magnitude of the expected real appreciation depends on both the degree of market segmen-
tation, as measured by φ, and the degree of persistence in money growth, as measured by
d(Etˆ μt+1)/dˆ μt.
Note that the market segmentation eﬀect and the expected inﬂation eﬀect have oppo-
site signs. If the market segmentation eﬀect dominates, then for values of μt close to ¯ μ,a n
increase in home money growth leads to an expected appreciation of the nominal exchange







Now consider how our model can generate the forward premium anomaly. The deﬁn-











23To get the forward premium anomaly, we need the impact of money growth on the interest
rate diﬀerential to have the opposite sign of its impact on expected depreciation. From (39)
we know that an increase in money growth drives down the risk premium. Under (47) this
increase in money growth generates an expected appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
If the impact of money growth on the risk premium is larger in magnitude than its impact
on the exchange rate, then the forward premium anomaly results.
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition:











then for μt close to ¯ μ, a change in money growth leads the interest rate diﬀerential and the
expected exchange rate depreciation to move in opposite directions.
Proof. Adding (43) and (46) gives that

















The ﬁrst inequality in (49) implies that d(it − i∗
t)/dˆ μ is positive, so that an increase in
money growth increases the interest rate diﬀerential. The second inequality in (49) implies
that d(Et loget+1 − loget)/dˆ μ is negative, so that an increase in money growth leads to an
expected exchange rate appreciation. Q.E.D.
Note that this proposition implies that our model generates the forward premium
anomaly only if money growth has an intermediate level of persistence. This is because to
get the anomaly, interest rate diﬀerentials and expected changes in exchange rates must move
in opposite directions after a money growth shock. Clearly, (47) provides an upper bound on
the persistence of money growth, generated by the requirement that the nominal exchange
rate be expected to appreciate after a money growth shock. This condition is also the right
24side inequality in (49). The requirement that the movement in the risk premium (39) be
larger than the expected depreciation gives the lower bound on the persistence of money
growth implied by the left side inequality in (49).
C. A Numerical Example with Time Series Data
Now we consider a simple numerical example that demonstrates, at least qualitatively, the
model’s implications for the movements over time of interest rates and exchange rates and
the values of some related variables. Note that we think of this example as simply illustrating
some of the behavior our model can generate, rather than as a deﬁnitive quantitative analysis
of the properties of interest rates and exchange rates. In our example, the endogenous nature
of our model’s market segmentation is critical for the model to be able to generate much time
variation in risk.
Statistics on Interest and Exchange Rates
We assume that a time period is a month. We let y =1and σ =2 , and we let a fraction
F(0) = .125 of the households have zero ﬁxed costs γ and the remainder have ﬁxed costs
with a uniform distribution on [0,γmax] with γmax = .1. Solving equations (19) and (20) for
cA(μ) and ¯ γ(μ) then gives φ =1 0 .9 and η =1 ,007 when ¯ μ is equal to exp(5/1200),w h i c hi s
5% inﬂation at an annualized rate.
In Figure 2A, we plot logcA(μ) against logμ (annualized). This ﬁgure shows that the
consumption of active households is increasing and concave in money growth in the relevant
range. Because of this nonlinearity, even if the fundamental shocks–here, changes in money
growth rates–have constant conditional variances, the resulting pricing kernels do not. Their
conditional variances change over time.
The main mechanism through which our model works is that the elasticity of the
marginal utility of active households varies with the money growth rate, that is, φ(μ) changes
with μ. In Figure 2B we plot φ(μ) against logμ (annualized). Clearly φ(μ) is falling as μ
increases. From (30) it is clear that this drop in φ(μ) reﬂects the concavity of logcA(μ) seen
in Figure 2A. (Note that to reconcile the graph of φ(μ) with η one must recall that η is not
expressed with logμ in annual units but rather in monthly units and the conversion factor
is 1200.) In Figure 2C we plot the fraction of the population that is active against logμ
25(annualized). Clearly, this participation rate rises as μ rises.
Now we use our quadratic approximation to the pricing kernel to illustrate the type of
interest rate and exchange rate behavior that our model can generate. We have constructed
this example so that the exchange rate is a martingale. Hence, interest rates are driven
entirely by movements in the risk premium, and the slope coeﬃcient b in the Fama regression
(5) is zero. We now demonstrate that with these features, our model, in addition to generating
as l o p ec o e ﬃcient similar to that in the data, generates some qualitative properties that are
similar to those of the data: interest rate diﬀerentials are persistent, and the exchange rate
is an order of magnitude more variable than interest rate diﬀerentials.
We choose the processes for the money growth rates in this example in order to ensure
that the nominal exchange rate follows a random walk (actually, a martingale). Speciﬁcally,
we choose these processes so that
Et loget+1 − loget = Et(logm
∗
t+1 − logmt+1)=0 .
Since the pricing kernel in each country is a function of only that country’s money growth, we
c h o o s et h e s ep r o c e s s e ss ot h a tf o rt h eh o m ec o u n t r yEt logmt+1 =l o gβ/¯ μ, where logmt+1 is
given by (33); we do likewise for the foreign country. For both the home and foreign countries,
we let these baseline processes be of the form
ˆ μt+1 = g(ˆ μt)+εt+1, ˆ μ
∗





Because (33) makes logmt+1 a quadratic function in μt and μt+1, the function g (·) that
makes the exchange rate a martingale turns out to be quadratic in μt. To see this, notice
that g (·) is obtained by substituting (52) into (33) and setting Et logmt+1 =l o gβ/¯ μ.T h e
quadratic equation for g (·) has two solutions; we select the one that implies a mean-reverting




/dˆ μt < 1 when the derivatives are evaluated at
ˆ μt =0 . We let εt and ε∗
t both be normal with mean zero and standard deviation σε, and we
let the correlation of εt and ε∗
t be ρε.
We use the parameter values φ =1 0and η =1 ,000 (which we think of as round
numbers that are motivated by the calculations above). Here, as before, we assume that a
period in the model is a month, and we again let ¯ μ correspond to an annualized inﬂation rate
of 5%. We set σε = .0035 and ρε = .5.9 With these parameters, the resulting money growth
26process of the form (52) is similar to that of an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation of .90.
To demonstrate this similarity, in Figure 3 we plot 245 realizations of our baseline money
growth process (52) and this AR(1) process based on the same driving shocks εt.
Now return to Table 1. There we have examined some properties of interest rates and
exchange rates in the data; here we compare to those data the properties implied by this
example. The model’s statistics for this example are reported for the slope coeﬃcient b =0 .
These model statistics are computed as the means over 100,000 draws of 245 periods each.
The statistics in the data, recall, are averages of the statistics for seven European countries
presented by Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001), each of which has 245 months of data.
The table shows that in both the data and the model, interest rate diﬀerentials do
vary, but not as much as changes in the exchange rate. Interest rate diﬀerentials are roughly
one-third as variable in the model as in the data. But in both the data and the model, changes
in the exchange rate have virtually no autocorrelation, whereas interest rate diﬀerentials have
a high autocorrelation. At a qualitative level, therefore, our model successfully reproduces
these features of the data.
Other Time Series Statistics
Our model also has implications for the disconnect between aggregate consumption and real
exchange rates. In this example, aggregate consumption is essentially constant, but real
exchange rates are quite variable; hence, real exchange rates are essentially disconnected
from ﬂuctuations in aggregate consumption. In this sense, our model is consistent with the
Backus-Smith puzzle (Backus and Smith 1993).
As discussed in our 2002 work, another feature of the data is that nominal and real
exchange rates have similar volatilities. From (46) and (50), we see that when φ is large, our
model will reproduce that observation. For instance, in our numerical example, the standard
deviation of changes in the real exchange rate is about 93% the size of the standard deviation
of changes in the nominal exchange rate.
We also considered an alternative numerical example with the money growth process
of the form (52) in which the function g(·) is chosen so that the slope coeﬃcient b in the
Fama regression is equal to −1 in population. The statistics for this numerical example, also
27reported in Table 1, are nearly identical to those of the earlier example.
The Role of Endogenous Segmentation
Now we show that allowing for endogenous segmentation in our model is a critical feature for
it to be able to generate substantial amounts of time variation in risk.
In our model, even if segmentation were exogenous, so that the fraction of households
that are active were ﬁxed, our model still could generate time-varying risk. This is because the
result in Proposition 3 does not depend on the ﬁnding of Proposition 2, that more households
pay the ﬁxed cost when money growth increases. Hence, logcA(μ) is concave, at least locally,
even if the fraction of households that pay the ﬁxed cost does not change with μ.T h u s ,t h e
same result would hold if segmentation were exogenous.
If segmentation were exogenous, however, the model could not generate much time
variation in risk. To see that, suppose that a fraction F(0) of households have zero ﬁxed costs
and, hence, are active and that the rest of the households are inactive. For this exogenous
segmentation model, it is easy to show that
φ = σ
1 − F(0)
¯ μ − [1 − F(0)]
and η =
¯ μ
¯ μ − [1 − F(0)]
φ. (53)
Thus, for example, with σ =2and ¯ μ =( 1 .05)1/12,t oh a v eφ =1 0 ,w en e e dF(0) = 1/6 and,
hence, η =6 0 . This value of η is an order of magnitude smaller than the value generated
by our endogenous segmentation model. As we show in Table 1 in the row labeled With
Exogenous Segmentation, when we simulate interest rates and exchange rates with these new
values of φ and η, choosing money growth to ensure that exchange rates follow a random
walk, we ﬁnd that interest rates barely ﬂuctuate. In particular, the standard deviation of the
interest rate diﬀerential from the model is one one-hundredth of that in the data.
Note, ﬁnally, that with F(0) = 1, so that all households are always active, the model
reduces to the standard constant velocity cash-in-advance model with no time variation in
risk.
D. Long-Run Averages
S of a rw eh a v ef o c u s e do nt h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fo u rm o d e lf o rﬂuctuations over time in the
interest rate diﬀerential and the exchange rate for a single pair of currencies. We have
28shown that our model can generate the forward premium anomaly, or the observation that
high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate over time. The data on long-run averages of
interest rate diﬀerentials and exchange rate changes in a cross section of currencies tend to
show the opposite pattern as the time series data: currencies that have high interest rates on
average tend to depreciate on average. (See, for example, Backus, Foresi, and Telmer 2001.)
Here we document that and then show that our model is qualitatively consistent with this
feature of the data as well.
To document this feature, we use monthly data on 14 countries kindly provided by
Ravi Bansal and Magnus Dahlquist. We use these data for the period from January 1976
to March 1998 to construct average one-month interest rate diﬀerentials between the U.S.
rate and each of the other countries’ rate as well as corresponding averages of exchange rate
changes over the period.
Figure 4A displays a scatterplot of the resulting values. It shows a clear positive
relationship between the averages, with a slope close to 1.
Our model is consistent with this cross section observation. To see that, suppose we
have a collection of countries with diﬀering permanent components of their money growth
rates ¯ μi that, in annualized terms, vary between 1% and 12% per year. For each of these
countries, we use values for the ﬁxed costs and the risk aversion parameter from our numerical
examples to compute the implied values of φi and ηi. We then construct money growth
processes, indexed by gi(μt) as before, so that for each country i, Et logmit+1 =l o g β/¯ μi,
where logmit+1 is the pricing kernel for country i. We then simulate 100,000 samples of length
245 for these countries and compute the average interest rate diﬀerential and exchange rate
change relative to our baseline country, which has the permanent component of its money
growth equal to 5% on an annualized basis.
In Figure 4B we plot the resulting average exchange rate changes against the average
interest rate diﬀerentials. Comparing Figures 4A and 4B, we see that our model is consistent
with the cross section observation that over the long run, currencies of countries that have
high interest rates on average tend to depreciate on average.
Of course, the standard model with no segmentation is consistent with this cross
section data as well. Unlike the standard model, however, our model can generate these
29long-run averages while at the same time generating the time series patterns of interest and
exchange rates that underlie the forward premium anomaly.
4. Conclusion
We have constructed a simple, general equilibrium monetary model with endogenously seg-
mented asset markets and have shown that this sort of friction may be a critical feature of
a complete model of interest rates and exchange rates. The fundamental challenge behind
this exercise has been to develop a model in which exchange rates roughly follow a random
walk (so that expected changes in exchange rates are roughly constant) while interest rate
diﬀerentials are highly variable and persistent. In such a model, by deﬁnition, movements in
interest rate diﬀerentials are movements in risk. Our main contribution here is to propose a
mechanism through which that risk changes because of changes in monetary policy.
30A p p e n d i xA :A nE x t e n s i o nw i t hT r a d ei nG o o d s
In the work above, we have kept the model simple by abstracting from the possibility of trade
in goods. Here we sketch out a version of the model with trade in goods that works similarly
to the original model. Essentially we take the models of Helpman and Razin (1982) and Lucas
(1982) and extend them to have ﬁxed costs of accessing asset markets. We demonstrate that
this extended model leads to results similar to those in the simple model. (Note that in
our economy we assume that goods are purchased in the sellers’ currency. An alternative
assumption is that goods are purchased in the buyers’ currency. For a discussion of the role
of these alternative assumptions, see Helpman and Razin 1984.)
In this extended model, let there be two goods h and f,referred to as home and foreign
goods. Households in the home country have endowments yh and yf of these goods, while
households in the foreign country have endowments y∗
h and y∗
f. Home country households have
an additively separable period utility function over these goods
αU(ch)+( 1− α)U(cf),
where α ∈ (0,1] and (ch,c f) denotes the consumption of the home and foreign goods by the








f) denotes the consumption of the home and foreign goods. When α ≥ 1/2,
preferences exhibit a type of home bias: home country households consume relatively more
home goods, and foreign households, relatively more foreign goods.
As in Helpman and Razin (1982) and Lucas (1982), home goods must be purchased
with home currency and foreign goods with foreign currency. Speciﬁcally, households in
each country have one cash-in-advance constraint for purchases of home goods and one for
purchases of foreign goods. Home households have a ﬁxed cost γ that applies to each transfer
of home currency between the home goods market and the asset market, and a separate ﬁxed
cost γ∗ that applies to each transfer of foreign currency between the foreign goods market
and the asset market. Home households are indexed by (γ,γ∗), w h i c hw ea s s u m eh a v ej o i n t
distribution given by F(γ)F ∗(γ∗). Foreign households are indexed by a symmetric distribution
31of costs: F(γ) for transfers between foreign goods markets and the asset market and F∗(γ∗)
for transfers between home goods markets and the asset market.
In the model, households now have more options of participation in the goods and asset
markets. They can transfer only home currency, only foreign currency, both currencies, or
none at all. For these diﬀerent patterns of transfer, the home households will pay γ,γ∗,γ+γ∗,
and 0, respectively, while the foreign households will pay γ∗,γ,γ∗ + γ, and 0, respectively.
It can be shown that the equilibrium allocations of home goods solve the following planning






































h/μ = yh + y
∗
h.
Here we denote the consumption of home goods by the home and foreign households by
chA and c∗
hA. We also denote the cutoﬀ values for transferring home currency to the home
goods market by the home and foreign households by ¯ γh and ¯ γ∗
h. The equilibrium allocations
of foreign goods solve a similar problem.
The solution to the problem for home goods is similar to the simpler problem in
which goods are not tradable. The link between money injections and households’ marginal
utilities is also similar. The key distinctions between the model with and without tradable
goods are as follows. Here all active households equate their marginal utilities; hence, the
consumption of home goods of home and foreign active households moves together. If a home
household does not make a transfer of home currency, then the home consumption of home
goods is ch = yh/μ. If a foreign household does not make a transfer of home currency, then
its consumption of the home good is c∗
h = y∗
h/μ. Hence, the value of making a transfer of
home currency for a home household diﬀers from that of making one for a foreign household.
32Likewise, the cost of making such a transfer is drawn from F(γ) for a home household and
from F ∗(γ∗) for a foreign household. Because of these diﬀerences in the value and costs
of making transfers, in general, the home households have a cutoﬀ function for transfers of
home currency ¯ γh(μ) which diﬀers from the cutoﬀ that foreign households have for transfers
of home currency ¯ γ∗
h(μ). A similar distinction holds with respect to foreign currency transfers.
Consider now a utility function of the form U(c)=c1−σ/(1 − σ). It is easy to show
that the optimal allocations {chA (μ),c ∗
hA(μ), ¯ γh (μ), ¯ γ∗
h (μ)} are increasing functions of
μ and that the consumption of home goods of the home and foreign active households are
proportional, c∗
hA(μ)=ωc hA (μ),w h e r eω =[ ( 1− α)/α]
1
σ .
Next we present a proposition in which the determination of the active households’
consumption and cutoﬀ function is identical to that in the model without tradable goods.
Proposition 8. Assume that endowments satisfy
y
∗
h/yh = ω (54)
and that the upper bound of the support for γ, denoted γmax,s a t i s ﬁes F ∗ (ωγmax)=1 . Then
¯ γh(μ) and ¯ γ∗
h(μ) satisfy ¯ γ∗
h (μ)=ω ¯ γh(μ), and the values of chA(μ) and ¯ γh (μ) are identical
to those in an economy with no tradable goods, an aggregate endowment of yh + y∗
h, and a





The proof of this proposition follows from verifying that the candidate solution satisﬁes
the ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem stated above. The assumption (54) includes the case
of completely symmetric countries, α =1 /2 and yh = y∗
h, but it is more general. In particular,
this assumption allows for a type of home bias preference of α ≥ 1/2 and specialization in
the endowments in the sense of yh >y ∗
h. T h eh o m eb i a si m p l i e st h a tch ≥ cf at μ = μ∗. This
assumption implies that for μ =1 , exports are zero, since ch = yh. For μ>1, however, there
typically will be trade in equilibrium, provided that F and F ∗ diﬀer.
When assumption (54) is not satisﬁed, ¯ γh and ¯ γ∗
h move together with μ, but they are
not necessarily proportional; hence, the expression of chA(μ) does not reduce exactly to that
33of the model with no tradable goods. Nevertheless, the expressions for chA and ¯ γh are similar
to those in that model.
T os e ew h y ,c o n s i d e rt h ee x t r e m ec a s ei nw h i c hy∗
h =0 , so that the foreign country
has no endowment of the home good. In this case, under appropriate conditions, all foreign
households engage in transfers of home currency, so that ¯ γ∗
h (μ)=γ∗
max. The resulting ex-
pressions for chA (μ) and ¯ γh (μ) correspond to those for the model with no tradable goods,
the cost functions ˜ F (γ)=[ F (γ)+ω]/(1 + ω) and ˜ F (0) = ω/ (1 + ω), the consumption of
inactive home households yh/μ, and the aggregate endowment [yh −
R
γ∗dF ∗ (γ∗)]/(1 + ω).
A p p e n d i xB :S o m eP r o o f s
Proof of Unique Solution (Requirement for Proposition 1)
Here we show that equations (19) and (20) have at most one solution for any given μ.
To see this result, solve for ¯ γ as a function of cA from (20) and suppress explicit










[U0(cA)]2[U(cA) − U(y/μ)]. (55)
Use (20) to see that d¯ γ(cA)/dcA is positive when cA +¯ γ − (y/μ) > 0 and negative when
cA +¯ γ − (y/μ) < 0. Substituting ¯ γ(cA) into (19) and diﬀerentiating the left side of the
resulting expression with respect to cA gives




Using (55), we see that (56) is strictly positive; hence, the equations have at most one solution.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Diﬀerentiating equations (19) and (20) with respect to μ and solving for ¯ γ0 gives that
¯ γ
0 (μ)=
[U0 (y/u) − U0 (cA)](y/μ) − U00 (cA)[cA +¯ γ − (y/μ)]1−F
F y/μ2
U0 (cA) − U00 (cA)[cA +¯ γ − (y/μ)]f/F
,
34where to simplify we have omitted the arguments in the functions F, f, cA,a n d¯ γ. Note that
cA (1) = y and ¯ γ (1) = 0. Also note that (19) implies that if μ>1, then cA +¯ γ − (y/μ) > 0.













/F(¯ γ(μ)), and note that the right side of (57) is
strictly positive for μ>1. It follows from this result and (20) that U0 (y/μ)−U0 (cA) > 0 for
μ>1. Finally, since U is strictly concave, U00 (cA) < 0;t h u s ,¯ γ0 > 0 for μ>1. Using similar
results for μ =1 , we get that γ0 (1) = 0. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
We ﬁrst show that φ(1) = σ[1 − F(0)]/F (0),w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ew h e nF(0) > 0. To see this,
diﬀerentiate (19) with respect to μ and ¯ γ, and use, from Proposition 2, that ¯ γ0 (1) = ¯ γ (1) = 0




1 − F (0)
F (0)
.
Using this expression for c0
A(1) and using cA (1) = y in φ(1) = σc0
A(1)/cA(1) gives our intended
result.
We next show that φ
0(1) = −φ(1)/F (0), which is negative because φ(1) > 0 and
F(0) > 0. To see this, ﬁrst diﬀerentiate (30) to get that
φ
















Second, diﬀerentiate (19) with respect to μ and ¯ γ, and use the result at μ =1 , ¯ γ0 (μ)=




1 − F (0)
F (0)
.
Using these expressions for c0
A and c00
A in (58) produces the desired result. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
To prove Proposition 4, we derive two equations, (37) and (38).
35To derive (37), start with (35), the risk premium deﬁned in terms of the pricing kernels.
Compute Et logmt+1 from (33). To compute logEtmt+1, we must compute
logEt exp
µh










To do that, use the result that if x is normally distributed with mean zero and variance














































































































































t+1 =0 . Q.E.D.
36Notes
1Technically, pt is simply the log of the excess return on foreign currency bonds. In
general, this excess return could arise for many reasons, including diﬀerences in taxes, liquidity
services, or transaction costs across bonds. We take the view here that ﬂuctuations in this
excess return are driven primarily by risk; hence, we refer to the excess return as the risk
premium.
2The forward premium anomaly can also be stated in terms of forward exchange rates.
The forward exchange rate ft is the price speciﬁed in a contract in period t in which the
buyer has the obligation to transfer ft dollars in t+1in exchange for one euro. The forward
premium is then the forward rate relative to the spot rate ft/et. Arbitrage implies that
logft − loget = it − i∗
t. Thus, (3) can be restated as cov(logft − loget,loget+1 − loget) < 0.
The forward premium and the expected change in exchange rates, therefore, tend to move in
opposite directions. This observation contradicts the hypothesis that the forward rate is a
good predictor of the future exchange rate.
3To see that (4) implies (6), use (1) to rewrite (4) as var(it −i∗
t)+cov(it −i∗
t,p t) ≤ 0
or
var (it − i
∗
t) ≤− cov(it − i
∗
t,p t)=−corr(it − i
∗
t,p t)std(it − i
∗
t)std(pt).
Then, as does Fama (1984), divide by std(it − i∗
t), and use the fact that a correlation is less
than or equal to one in absolute value.
4It is easy to see that if we replace the assumption that each household draws its ﬁxed
cost once with the assumption that each household takes an i.i.d. draw of its ﬁxed cost each
period, the analysis is identical.
5Recall our assumptions that a complete set of nominal claims are traded in the asset
market and that agents face a ﬁxed cost of transferring cash between the asset market and
the goods market. These assumptions imply that we do not have a complete set of con-
tingent claims to consumption. Because of the ﬁxed cost, households choose to bear some
consumption risk endogenously.
376This condition ensures that Etmt+1 exists. In Appendix B, in the proof of Proposition





we need this condition to have this integral well-deﬁned.
7Note that in both our segmented market model and the standard model, when today’s
money growth rate increases, today’s exchange rate depreciates. In the segmented market
model, this initial depreciation is so large that it leads to overshooting, in that after the
impact period, the exchange rate appreciates. In the standard model, this initial depreciation
is small, and hence, it leads to undershooting, in that after the impact period, the exchange
continues to depreciate.
8Doing so gives that the expected depreciation of the real exchange rate is given by
Et logvt+1 − logvt =
−φEt(ˆ μ
∗














t − ˆ μ
2
t).
9See Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) for a discussion of the correlation of
home and foreign pricing kernels needed to explain the data.
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42Figure 1   Timing in the Two Markets for a Household in the Home Country 
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Figure 2A    How the Log of the Consumption of Active Households
                    Is Related to the Log of Money Growth
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Figure 2B    How the Elasticity of Marginal Utility φ(μ)
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                    Related to the Log of Money Growth
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Figure 4A  In the Data 
 
Average One-Month Interest Rate Differential (U.S. Less Other Country) vs. 
Average One-Month Change in Exchange Rate (with U.S. Dollar) 







































*The countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy,  
Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.  
 
Sources: Data studied in Ravi Bansal and Magnus Dahlquist 2000 
  
 
Figure 4B  In the Model 
 
Average One-Month Interest Rate Differential (Home Less Foreign Country) vs. 
Average One-Month Change in Exchange Rate (with Home Currency) 







































**For the home country, we used the baseline process for money with the permanent component of money 
growth μ  equal to 5% at an annual basis. We then constructed 29 foreign countries with the same 
process for money except that  μ  varies from 1% to 12% in .5% increments. We then computed the 
average one-month interest rate differential and average one-month depreciation rate over 100,000 
simulations of length 245. 
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U.S. vs. Euro Data  .3  3.0  .83  .04 
        
Model Predictions        
    With b = 0  .1  4.8  .92  0 
    With b = −1  .1 4.8  .92 0 
    With Exogenous Segmentation  .003  3.1  .89  0 
 
Note: The data values are based on Backus, Foresi, and Telmer’s (2001) monthly values on U.S. and euro currencies from July 
1974 through November 1994. In the model denoted b = 0, the process for money is chosen so that the slope coefficient in the 
Fama regression equals 0; in the model denoted b =  −1, that coefficient equals −1.  In the model denoted Exogenous Segmenta-
tion, the fraction of active households is fixed at F(0).  The standard deviations have been multiplied by 100 to express them in 
percentage points. To annualize them, multiply each by 12. 
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